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Degrees of Freedom and Secrecy in Wireless Relay Networks
Arsenia Chorti∗, Ragnar Freij†, and David Karpuk‡
Abstract
We translate the problem of designing a secure communications protocol for sev-
eral users communicating through a relay in a wireless network into understanding
certain subvarieties of products of Grassmannians. We calculate the dimension of
these subvarieties and provide various results concerning their defining equations.
When the relay and all of the users have the same number of antennas, this approach
places fundamental limits on the amount of data that can be passed through such
a network.
1 Introduction
Applications of algebra and algebraic geometry to communications engineering tradi-
tionally appears in terms of error-correcting codes. More specifically, error-correcting
codes constructed from vector bundles on curves over finite fields are well-known to have
desirable properties. More recently, the advent of wireless communications has opened
up new avenues for applied algebraic geometry, which are much less well-tread. For
example, minimizing interference in certain channels can be reduced to cleverly pick-
ing subspaces of a given vector space, necessitating the understanding of subvarieties of
products of Grassmannians; see [1]. In the present article we apply some of these ideas
to networks in which users are communicating through a relay.
We will be concerned specifically with transmitting data through a relay, a common
scenario in which users who lack a direct link with each other send their information
to the relay, who then forwards the information back to the users. Furthermore, we
consider situations in which the relay is untrustworthy, and thus the users would like
to pass information through the relay while simultaneously minimizing the amount of
information the relay can access. The relevant wireless communications background will
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be introduced and explained as is necessary in what follows, and the relevant channel
models can be found in, for example, [3–5].
Information can be kept secret from a relay by arranging a communications protocol
so that the relay only observes certain sums of transmitted data; see [4] as well as the
articles [2, 3]. Effective transmission between two users means minimizing the interfer-
ence coming from the other users communicating through the same relay. In algebraic
terms, this amounts to pairs of users simultaneously choosing subspaces of a given vector
space, subject to the conditions that the secrecy is maintained and the interference is
minimized.
In what follows, we translate the problem of designing a secure communications
protocol for several users communicating through a relay into understanding certain
subvarieties of products of Grassmannians. We calculate the dimension of these sub-
varieties and study their defining equations, which give us a hint as to the difficulty of
constructing such a protocol. When the relay and all of the users have the same number
of antennas, this approach classifies the available degrees of freedom completely, thus
placing fundamental limits on the amount of data that can be passed securely through
such a network. Our approach is largely inspired by [1], wherein the authors provide
limits on the degrees of freedom in certain interference channels.
1.1 Two users
Suppose we have two users, Alice (user 1) and Bob (user 2) who wish to communicate
wirelessly with each other, but the only direct link is through a relay, Ray. The data Alice
and Bob wish to send to each other can be represented by complex numbers x1, x2 ∈ C,
respectively, called information symbols. Alice and Bob transmit this information to
Ray, who then forwards it back to both Alice and Bob. This simple network can be
modeled by the following equations (see [5]):
r = h1x1 + h2x2 + z (1)
y˜1 = g1r = g1h1x1 + g1h2x2 + g1z + w1 (2)
y˜2 = g2r = g2h1x1 + g2h2x2 + g2z + w2 (3)
where h1, h2 ∈ C are the channel coefficients which model the effect of the channel
from Alice to Ray and Bob to Ray, respectively. Similarly, g1, g2 ∈ C are the channel
coefficients from Ray to Alice and Bob, respectively. Here, z, w1, and w2 represents the
additive noise at Ray, Alice, and Bob, which are i.i.d. zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables.
We assume that knowledge of hi and gi is globally available. In this case, Alice and
Bob can subtract off their own data and arrive at the observations
y1 = g1h2x2 + g1z + w1 (4)
y2 = g2h1x1 + g2z + w2 (5)
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The xi are typically taken from a finite subset X ⊂ C called a codebook or constellation.
Since the noise is zero mean, Alice and Bob can now decode the other’s data by solving
xˆ2 = argmin
x∈X
|g1h2x− y1|
2 (6)
xˆ1 = argmin
x∈X
|g2h1x− y2|
2 (7)
which provides a maximum-likelihood estimate of x1 and x2. The decoding is successful
if xˆi = xi, and the success rate depends on the variance of the noise.
In general, the relay cannot reliably decode x1 and x2 as it only has access to a
linear combination, and essentially would have to attempt to solve one equation in two
variables to decode. If Alice and Bob pre-multiply their symbols xi by some ui ∈ C such
that h1u1 = h2u2 = h, then the observation at the relay will be
r = h1u1x1 + h2u2x2 + z = h(x1 + x2) + z (8)
which guarantees that the relay can only observe the sum x1 + x2. Typically there will
be multiple pairs (x1, x2) which give the same sum x1+x2. For example, let us take our
constellation to be X = {±1,±i}. Suppose that Alice and Bob happen to send x1 and
x2 such that x1 + x2 = 0. Even if Ray can correctly decode the sum of the symbols to
be 0, he must still guess uniformly at random between the four possible combinations
(1,−1), (−1, 1), (i,−i), and (−i, i) of transmitted signals. This general principle can be
exploited to achieve non-trivial secrecy in the case of an untrustworthy relay, see [3, 4].
2 Multi-user communication through a relay
In the above setup with only two users, each of whom has only one antenna, only one
information symbol was exchanged between the two users. In what follows we add more
users and more antennas, both for the users and the relay, and study how this affects the
amount of data that can be passed through such a network. Informally, we are asking
the following questions: What is the maximal
∑
i di so that user i can send and receive
di information symbols, while the relay observes only linear combinations of information
symbols? How does
∑
i di depend on the number of relay antennas and the number of
user antennas?
2.1 The general system model
We again refer to [5, 7] and the references therein for the equations below which model
our channels. Suppose that we have K users that wish to communicate with each
other through a relay, all of whom possibly have more than one antenna. In general,
effective transmission/encoding and reception/decoding of d information symbols at user
i requires that user i has N ≥ d antennas; essentially each antenna gives a linear equation
in the d information symbols, see [7] for more information. A channel between a user
with N antennas and a relay with M antennas is essentially a matrix H ∈ CM×N , which
we make precise in what follows.
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The ith user desires di degrees of freedom, that is, they will be transmitting a vector
xi ∈ C
di of information symbols. We assume that all users have N antennas, that
N ≥ di for all i to allow for linear encoding. User i uses an N × di encoding matrix
Ui to compute a vector Uixi of encoded symbols. We further assume that the relay has
M ≥ N antennas.
The channel from user i to the relay will be denoted by Hi ∈ C
M×N , and the channel
from the relay to user k by Gk ∈ C
N×M . We assume all channel state information
is available to all users and all relays, and that Hi and Gk are selected according to
some continuous distribution, so that, for example, all channel matrices are generically
invertible.
The users transmit their data to the relay simultaneously, so that the relay observes
r =
K∑
i=1
HiUixi + z. (9)
where z ∈ CM×1 is a column vector of i.i.d. zero-mean circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables. The relay then transmits the received message back to the
users, so that user k observes
y˜k = Gkr =
K∑
i=1
GkHiUixi +Gkz + wk (10)
where wk ∈ C
N×1 is a column vector of i.i.d. zero-mean circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables. Since channel information is globally available and user k
knows their own data, they can subtract off the quantity GkHkUkxk and obtain
yk =
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
GkHiUixi +Gkz + wk (11)
from which they attempt to decode some subset of the coordinates of {x1, . . . , xK},
depending on what data they require.
2.2 The general strategy
Let us denote the M -dimensional vector space at the relay by V . For each i = 1, . . . ,K,
we pick for user i subspaces Vi = colspan(HiUi) of V , such that dimVi = di for all i.
The space Vi is the target for all of user i’s symbols, and the target for any other user
sending symbols to user i. So that no symbol arrives in Vi “unmasked” and that the
symbols arriving from different users are guaranteed to be independent, we insist that
Vi =
K⊕
j=1
j 6=i
Vi ∩ Vj (12)
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The relay thus only observes non-trivial linear combinations of information symbols, and
thus cannot reliably decode any symbols transmitted to or from user i.
To make full use of all of the M antennas at the relay, we further insist that V =∑
i Vi, so that all of the space at the relay can be occupied by a linear combination
of vectors from the users. To avoid overlapping triples of symbols, we want to further
decompose V as
V =
K−1⊕
i=1
K⊕
j=i+1
Vi ∩ Vj (13)
For user i to decode, we first write
V = Vi ⊕ Ii, where Ii =
⊕
1≤j<k≤K
j,k 6=i
Vj ∩ Vk (14)
is the ith user’s interference space, coming from the terms in (13) which do not involve
i. If Gi denotes the channel matrix from the relay to the i
th user, then the observation
at user i lies in
GiV = GiVi ⊕GiIi (15)
Since ourGi is assumed to be invertible with probability 1, we can assume that dim(GiVi) =
di, and hence user i can still linearly decode all of their information symbols.
To decode the symbols contained in GiVi, user i must first project onto the perp
space of GiIi. Let Pi denote this projection, and let us, by slight abuse of notation,
identify Vi with a matrix whose columns are an orthonormal basis of Vi. The strength
of the signal at user i is then dependent on the squared Frobenius norm ||PiGiVi||
2
F , and
the strength of the noise at user i depends on ||PiGiz||
2
F + ||Piwi||
2
F . The success of user
i’s decoding is then dependent on the signal-to-noise ratio
SNRi =
||PiGiVi||
2
F
||PiGiz||2F + ||Piwi||
2
F
(16)
Ideally one would like to maximize all of the SNRi independently of each other. However,
note that Pi depends on Ii and thus all Vj for j 6= i, so one cannot a priori optimize
the SNRi independently. Such optimization problems are generally very difficult and
depend on the dimension of the space of all strategies, which motivates us to understand
the space of all feasible strategies as explicitly as possible.
Example 2.1. Let us demonstrate our strategy with K = N = M = 3 and d1 = d2 =
d3 = d = 2. Choose a basis {v1, v2, v3} of V , and set
V1 = span(v1, v2), V2 = span(v2, v3), V3 = span(v1, v3) (17)
so that
V = (V1 ∩ V3)⊕ (V1 ∩ V2)⊕ (V2 ∩ V3) (18)
and pick the encoding matrices Ui so that (HiUi)
(i) = vi and (HiUi)
(i+1) = vi+1, where
A(i) means the ith column of the matrix A.
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Now suppose that xi = [x
1
i , x
2
i ]
t ∈ Cd is the vector of information symbols that the
ith node wants to send. Given the above encoding matrices, the observation at the relay
can be expressed in the basis {v1, v2, v3} as:
r = H1U1x1 +H2U2x2 +H3U3x3 + z =

x11 + x23x21 + x12
x22 + x
1
3

+ z (19)
Once the relay forwards on this information to the users, we can write user 1’s observa-
tion as
y˜1 = G1r = G1

x11 + x23x21 + x12
0

+G1

 00
x22 + x
1
3

+ g1z + w1 (20)
Since user 1 knows x11 and x
2
1 as well as the matrix G1, they can subtract off G1[x
1
1 x
2
1 0]
t
from y˜1 and arrive at
y1 = G1

x23x12
0

+G1

 00
x22 + x
1
3

+ g1z + w1 (21)
User 1 can now recover x12 and x
2
3 by projecting y1 onto the two-dimensional perp space
of G1v3. Similarly, user 2 can recover x
2
1 and x
1
3, and user 3 can recover x
2
2 and x
1
1. 
Note that in the above example, we picked not only the subspaces Vi but also specified
bases. This reflects additional flexibility available to the users, who may prefer one basis
over another to minimize the probability that the relay can decode their information.
However, this is a subtlety we shall ignore as it does not affect the degrees of freedom.
3 Feasible strategies for M = N
Throughout this section we assume that the relay has M = N antennas. We first inves-
tigate the resulting parameters defining feasible strategies, and see that this immediately
places rather strong conditions on
∑
i di. We then study in depth the resulting variety
of feasible strategies.
3.1 Feasible tuples
Our general strategy in the previous section motivates the following definition and the-
orem, which tells us for what parameters there exists a viable communications strategy.
Definition 3.1. A tuple (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) is feasible if given a N -dimensional complex
vector space V , there exist subspaces V1, . . . , VK satisfying
(i) dim(Vi) = di for all i = 1, . . . ,K,
(ii) Vi =
⊕
j 6=i Vi ∩ Vj for all i = 1, . . . ,K, and
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(iii) V =
⊕
1≤i<j≤K Vi ∩ Vj
If (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) is a feasible tuple, we will call a collection (V1, . . . , VK) of subspaces
of V satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii) a feasible strategy.
Theorem 3.1. The tuple (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) is feasible if and only if
K∑
i=1
di = 2N, (22)
and di ≤ N for each i.
Proof. Let us first assume that we have a feasible tuple and write V =
⊕
1≤i<j≤K Vi∩Vj.
Let dij = dim(Vi ∩ Vj). The assumption Vi =
⊕
j 6=i Vi ∩ Vj implies that di = dim(Vi) =∑
j 6=i dij . Using this, we have
dim(V ) =
K−1∑
i=1
K∑
j=i+1
dij (23)
=
K−1∑
i=1

di − i−1∑
j=1
dji

 (24)
=
K−1∑
i=1
di − (dim(V )−
K−1∑
j=1
djK) (25)
=
K−1∑
i=1
di − (dim(V )− dK) (26)
=
K∑
i=1
di − dim(V ) (27)
Rearranging dim(V ) =
∑
i di − dim(V ) gives the result, since dim(V ) = N .
To prove the converse, assume that
∑
i di = 2N . Let V be a complex vector space
of dimension N with basis v1, . . . , vN , and let W ⊇ V be a complex vector space of
dimension 2N with basis v1, . . . , v2N . Let P : W → V be the projection given by
vN+k 7→ vk for k = 1, · · · , N . If we set Di =
∑i
j=1 dj, we can construct the spaces
Wi ⊆ W explicitly as Wi = P span
(
vDi−1+1, · · · , vDi
)
. As di ≤ N , the projection P is
injective on each Wi, so we can assign Vi = P (Wi). Now, it is clear by construction that
dimVi = di, Vi = ⊕j 6=iVi ∩ Vj , and that V =
⊕
1≤i<j≤K Vi ∩ Vj .
Proposition 3.2. Suppose we are given a feasible tuple (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) and subspaces
V1, . . . , VK of V such that
(i) dim(Vi) = di for all i = 1, . . . ,K,
(ii) Vi =
⊕
j 6=i Vi ∩ Vj for all i = 1, . . . ,K, and
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(iii) Vi ∩ Vj ∩ Vk = 0 for all distinct triples (i, j, k).
Then (V1, . . . , VK) is a feasible strategy.
Proof. Let W =
∑
1≤i<j≤K Vi ∩ Vj ⊆ V . By (iii) we have Vi ∩ Vj ∩ Vk ∩ Vl = 0 for all
quadruples of indices (i, j, k, l), unless i = k and j = l. It follows that W decomposes as
a direct sum,
W =
⊕
1≤i<j≤K
Vi ∩ Vj ⊆ V (28)
from which it follows that (K,dim(W ), d1, . . . , dK) is a feasible tuple. By Theorem 3.3
we must have
∑
i di = 2dim(W ) and thus dim(W ) = N , hence W = V .
3.2 The feasible variety
Definition 3.2. Let (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) be a feasible tuple, so that
∑
i di = 2N , and fix
an N -dimensional complex vector space V . We define the feasible variety to be
Z =
{
(V1, . . . , VK) ∈
K∏
i=1
G(di, N) | (V1, . . . , VK) is a feasible strategy
}
(29)
where G(di, N) denotes the Grassmannian of di-dimensional subspaces of V ≃ C
N .
Example 3.1. Suppose that K = 4, N = 2, and d1 = · · · = d4 = 1. Constructing a
feasible strategy means finding lines V1, . . . , V4 in C
2 satisfying (i) and (ii) of Definition
3.1. This is clearly equivalent to finding two distinct lines L1 6= L2 in C
2, and then
setting, for example V1 = V2 = L1 and V3 = V4 = L2 (or any other partition of the
users into two groups of two). The feasible variety can thus be identified with (P1(C)×
P
1(C))−∆, where ∆ is the diagonal.
From now on we restrict to tuples of the form (K,N, d1, . . . , dK) such that d1 =
· · · = dK = d. We will abbreviate these as (K,N, d). In this case (K,N, d) is feasible if
and only if Kd = 2N . The following theorem classifies exactly when generic strategies
(V1, . . . , VK) are feasible. From an applications point of view this is useful as it makes
clear exactly for which tuples (K,N, d) the users can essentially pick arbitrary subspaces.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that (K,N, d) is a feasible tuple. Then Z is a dense, Zariski open
subset of
∏K
i=1G(d,N) if and only if (K,N, d) is of the form (2, N,N) or (3, N, 2N/3).
Proof. Suppose first that we are given a feasible tuple (K,N, d) such that Z is a dense,
Zariski open subset of
∏K
i=1G(d,N). Then for generic choice of (V1, . . . , VK), we have
d = dim(Vi) = dim
K⊕
j=1
j 6=i
Vi ∩ Vj = (K − 1)e (30)
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where e is the dimension of the intersection of two generic d-dimensional subspaces of
C
N . If 2d ≤ N then e = 0 and hence d = 0, thus we may assume 2d > N . In this case
we have e = 2d−N , and hence
d = (K − 1)(2d −N) (31)
Substituting d = 2N/K and simplifying yields the equation
(K2 − 5K + 6)N = 0 (32)
and therefore K = 2 or K = 3. The relation Kd = 2N now gives the desired tuples.
For the converse, let us start with the tuple (2, N,N). In this case there is only one
possible strategy, namely given by both users selecting V1 = V2 = C
N , which is of course
feasible. In the other case of the tuple (3, N, 2N/3), it is easy to check that generic
choices of V1, V2, V3 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.2, which completes the proof
of the theorem.
Corollary 3.4. For K = 3 users, the feasible variety Z has dimension 2N2/3.
Proof. Since Z is Zariski open and dense in
∏3
i=1G(2N/3, N), it has the same dimension
as this variety. Since dimG(d,N) = d(N − d), the result follows.
3.3 The complement of the feasible variety when K = 3
When (K,N, d) is a feasible tuple, Theorem 3.3 shows that a generic strategy is feasible
exactly when K = 2 or K = 3. When K = 2 the sufficient conditions for (V1, V2) to
be a feasible strategy given by Proposition 3.2 are trivially satisfied. When K = 3,
this raises the question about the complement of the feasible variety, which is Zariski
closed, and hence can be written as the variety defined by an ideal in the function ring
on
∏3
i=1G(d,N), where d = 2N/3.
For a nicely parametrized presentation of this ring, corresponding to a coordinate
system on the Grassmannians, we will use the Plu¨cker embedding
ι : G(d,N) →֒ P
(
d∧
C
N
)
. (33)
This is the natural embedding defined by
ι : Span{v1, · · · , vd} 7→ C(v1 ∧ · · · ∧ vd), (34)
and whose image is the subvariety given by a number of quadratic equations in the d×n
complex variables {v1, · · · , vd}. These equations are known as the Plu¨cker relations, and
the ideal they generate is denoted Pd.
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In the ambient space P
(∧d
C
N
)3
, we can now write down the equations for variety
of non-feasible strategies, denoted by Z¯. Indeed, we have
Z¯ =
{
(V1, V2, V3) ∈
3∏
i=1
G(d,N)
∣∣ dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) > 0
}
=
{
(V1, V2, V3) ∈
3∏
i=1
G(d,N)
∣∣ ∃w : w|ιV1, w|ιV2, w|ιV3
}
.
=
{
(V1, V2, V3) ∈
3∏
i=1
G(d,N)
∣∣ ∃w : w ⊗ w ⊗ w|ιV1 ⊗ ιV2 ⊗ ιV3
}
.
(35)
This means that ιV1⊗ ιV2⊗ ιV3 lies in the ideal generated by N cubics, indexed by basis
vectors of CN . Note that we have here used the standard identification of the exterior
product with its dual. We have also identified the dual of a direct product of spaces
with the tensor product of their duals [6].
We see from the above that Z¯ can be written as a cubic irreducible variety in the
product of Grassmannians. The codimension of Z¯ is easily seen to be
2N − d− d− d+ 1 = 1. (36)
Example 3.2. Suppose that K = N = 3 and d = 2. We have the identification
G(2, 3) ≃ G(1, 3) = P2(C) given by, for example, fixing an inner product and taking a
plane to its perp space. Under this identification, the feasible variety Z gets identified
with
Z = {(L1, L2, L3) ∈ P
2(C)3 | span(L1, L2, L3) = C
3} (37)
If we give projective coordinates [xi : yi : zi] to the i
th copy of P2(C), then the complement
Z¯ is therefore defined by the single equation
det

x1 x2 x3y1 y2 y3
z1 z2 z3

 = 0 (38)
That is, Z¯ is the determinantal variety in P2(C)× P2(C)× P2(C), and hence defined by
a single irreducible cubic.
3.4 Dimension of the feasible variety
Suppose we have fixed some feasible tuple (K,N, d) and some relay space V . To examine
further the dimension of the feasible variety, let us further fix some set {dij}1≤i<j≤K of
desired dimensions for the Vi ∩Vj. In practical terms, this means that we are examining
strategies in which users i and j are exchanging dij information symbols with each other.
The assumption Vi =
⊕
j 6=i Vi ∩ Vj then forces d = dim(Vi) =
∑
j 6=i dij for all i. Let us
denote the corresponding variety of feasible strategies by Z0.
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Theorem 3.5. Suppose that (K,N, d) is a feasible tuple and we fix desired pairwise
degrees of freedom {dij}1≤i<j≤K . Then the feasible variety Z
0 of strategies is isomorphic
to a dense, Zariski open subset of
S =
K−1∏
i=1
K∏
j=i+1
G(dij , N), (39)
and therefore has dimension
dim(Z0) = dim(S) =
K−1∑
i=1
K∑
j=i+1
dij(N − dij) (40)
Proof. Suppose that (V1, . . . , VK) is a feasible strategy. We can map it to an element of
S by the obvious map
(V1, . . . , VK) 7→ (Vi ∩ Vj)1≤i<j≤K (41)
Conversely, consider the set of all (Vij)1≤i<j≤K in S such that
(i) Vi :=
∑
j 6=i Vij has dimension dim(Vi) = d for all i, and
(ii) Vij ∩ Vkl = 0 unless (i, j) = (k, l).
One can see easily that (i) and (ii) are generically satisfied, and thus this is a dense,
Zariski open subset of S. Furthermore, the sum in (i) is easily seen to be generically
direct, and thus the corresponding tuple (V1, . . . , VK) is a feasible strategy by Proposition
3.2. The theorem follows easily.
Let us compute the dimension of Z0 for some desired pairwise degrees of freedom
which are of practical interest.
Example 3.3. Suppose that dij = dkl for all (i, j) 6= (k, l), so that every pair of users is
exchanging the same number of information symbols. From Vi =
⊕
j 6=i Vi ∩ Vj it follows
that dij = d/(K − 1) for all i, j. Using the relation Kd = 2N and the above theorem
gives
dim(Z0) =
(
K
2
)
d(N − d) (42)
= N2
(
1−
2
K(K − 1)
)
whenever dij = d/(K − 1) for all i, j (43)
Example 3.4. Suppose that K is even and we pair up the users so that for i odd, only
users i and i+ 1 share their information symbols. In other words,
dij =
{
d i odd and j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
(44)
Then using the above theorem and the equation Kd = 2N gives
dim(Z0) =
K∑
i=1
i odd
d(N − d) = N2(1− 2/K) (45)
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